Patricia S. Greenspan: Asymmetrical Practical Reasons (pp. 1-3)

Explicator's note: I found this article hard to get into. Just check out the first paragraph! The sentences are very convoluted, and for no good end that I can see. Of course, this makes a clear explication all the more necessary. I'm falling back on a paragraph by paragraph note taking. We'll see where that ends up. (I'll point out that I think this is a draft, so it should not be taken as completed work, and criticism should be interpreted in that light.)

¶ 1. The conventional (homogeneous) view: reasons for or against (positive and negative reasons) exhibit the same range of normative force. That is, merely that a reason is for an action (let's say) or against it does not give you any sense of how compelling a reason it is. Greenspan rejects this view for the view that only negative reasons can be compelling. So there is an asymmetry between negative and positive reasons.

¶ 2. Negative reasons count against the option, not just for the omission of the option. The latter is a positive reason for the not-doing. The former is a criticism of the option (or of taking the option). Thus far, I am with the standard view.

¶ 3-6. Here, she gives an example that illustrates one aspect of the asymmetry, to wit, having a positive reason for an alternative (in the example, "wear the green jacket") does not generate any negative reason, e.g., against the other alternatives (e.g., "wear the blue jacket"). Now I'm a bit worried, since in the prior paragraph, the generated positive reason was with regard to the very same option. That is, having a reason against the option is a reason to not take that option. In this paragraph the options shift. Now, having written that, I think I see the alignment: having a reason for choosing the green jacket does not generate a reason against not wearing the green jacket (in the example, since not wearing a jacket isn't an option, a reason against wearing the green would have to be a reason for wearing another jacket, since that is what's required to not wear the green). The nutshell is that positive reasons "unless they really conceal or are taken to imply serious negative reasons [emph. added] seem to allow for rational alternatives". Positive reasons support recommendations, whereas negative reasons support prohibitions.

That qualifier is pretty significant. What's the difference between concealing or being taken to imply serious negative reasons and negative reasons generating a positive reason for not the option? Aren't there negative reasons that are as weak as some of these positive reasons? I wore the blue coat yesterday and that's generally a reason against wearing it again today, just, for me, not a very strong one. Ceteris paribus, it's a reason not to wear the blue. In the light of almost any other reason, it's negligible. Similarly, my mild positive reason for wearing the green is, ceteris paribus, a reason against wearing the blue. I think the confusing thing is that the positive reason is so weak, that mere whim can override it. (Whimsy is a valid fashion/style motivation, after all.) And it does open one up to critcism, however mild, or, at least, to question. Letting whim rule in these mild cases doesn't impugn one's general rationality (indeed, one might have second order reasons for not being so rigid all the time), but, in the light of other trends, they could be indicators of problems.

¶ 7-8. Greenspan is trying to weaken the connection between reasons per se and bindingness or compulsion. That is, she argues against "the view that reasons compel". This is, of course, not to say that reasons can't be overruled. Reasons have strengths and can be weighed. But, on this view, reasons always have force, but rational action is determine by the balance of forces. I don't know why this analogy doesn't suggest that there might be zero or negligible force reasons, or that our will might itself have force, but ok. Greenspan is with "some recent [but uncited] authors" in thinking that there are optional reasons, that is, reasons that allow us options. Now, of course, as Greenspan points out, you can get optionality in a balance of force model, that is, the reasons for each option is roughly equal, so none determines. Greenspan specifically claims that pure positive reasons are merely optional.

¶ 9-11. She gives a paradigm example:

To illustrate the kind of case I have in mind: I recall an occasion when a University administrator, trying to offer positive motivation for faculty to serve on committees, appealed to the possibility of attaining power in the University. Now, I would grant that this is a reason to serve — and a reason for me, a reason I “have”, at any rate once it is brought to my attention — though I think I would still be within my rights, rationally speaking (as well as otherwise), to turn it down. Nor do I have to refer to the various academic and other goals I have, as competing reasons that serving on a committee might tend to undermine. We might suppose that I have the extra time but feel no need to fi ll it with anything. Even considered just in itself, apart from any competing reasons, power of the sort in question is something I could see as a potential benefit and in that sense take as a reason but not as a compelling reason.

The last sentence is crucial: it is a potential benefit. It's being a potential benefit is sufficient to make it a reason, but not a compelling reason. There is a bit of ambiguity in the term "compelling reason" between a reason with any normative force, and one with overriding normative force. We agree that attaining power in the University in this situation is not overriding. But I'm not sure that it has no pull, whatsoever. For example, perhaps I don't want power. It may not interest me. I may have no projects that require it. Since I only have finite resources, any action has to be weighed as to whether it'll be worth the bother and worth the risk of cutting off future options, including the option to be a bit idle.

Greenspan acknowledges that the positive reason might act in coordination with associated negative reasons, e.g., if failing to take power would negatively affect other goals or projects. But wouldn't other positive goals do that? E.g., "free food!", "free travel", or "lots of fun meetings with cool beureaucrats" might make it seem like the benefits were worth making a decision. Each additional positive reason increases the pull. Greenspan might retort that each of these points up a negative reasons, lack of free food, travel, or fun meetings, so these are really negative reasons in disguise. But this line seems vacuous, if I would suffer from the lack of free food, then I see a clear negative reason. But if the lack of these other things is a negative reason why isn't the lack of power a similar reason? I can't have everything and I can't practically have everything I could in some sense have. And, of course, the pursuit of everything I could have, even could easily have, might have costs. (The paradox of hedonism rears up.)

¶ 12. Here she responds to the idea that lack of power is a reason against declining committee service. Her reply is that the negative formulation implies a criticism of her current level of power, thus is not strictly equivalent to the positive formulation. Frankly, I don't see it. The negative formulation is that you lack this additional power, which has benefits (as she's acknowledge). So she fails to have those acknowledged benefits if she doesn't take the power. She might be ok with that. The benefits aren't so very great, or too much bother, or she suspects that similarly good or better benefits might come along (is this an opportunity cost negative reason?). I don't see why these are additional if the positive reasons generated by a negative reasons are not also additional. What are pure negative reasons?

¶ 13. So, her line is based on the "critical conception of practical reason" rather than the "action guiding conception of practical reason". That is, on her view, reasons are responses to criticism; action guidance is consequential on a need to feel justified in our actions. Negative evaluation is more important than positive evaluation, she claims, hence it's more important to avoid criticism based on negative reasons than to, what, garner praise based on positive reasons?

¶ 14. Motivational force, whether internalist or externalist (and she is internalist: rationality itself produced motivation to avoid significant criticism), is based on a threshold of adequacy. Once you are over the threshold, that is, once you have sufficient justification for your choice, then you are done. Additional justification only adds breathing space, so to speak. If you have overkilling justification, then there is little critical activity to fear. Indeed, having a habit of overkill may make you, by default, less subject to critical encounters.

¶ 15. So we arrive at the heart of her view of rationality. Negative reasons are critical; positive reasons respond to criticism. To get over the threshold requires having a response to every significant criticism, that is, to have sufficient positive reasons to overcome any obtaining negative reasons. If there is no negative reason, then all the positive reason does is provide a guard against some possible criticism. (Is having no reason to do something a criticism? "Why did you do that?" "No reason." "That's not a reason." "Do I have to have a reason for everything?" This is intelligible dialogue which supports Greenspan somewhat. It seems to be a defense to have no reason in the absence of more specific criticism. Of course, what one might expect next is, "Aimlessness isn't good. You need to have purpose; to make choices; to weigh options; to explore possibilities." Now, is this generalized criticism proving Greenspan's point? After all, I did have to appeal to a criticism. But the criticism is not having reasons for making choices. One can see a more refined dialogue wherein someone only avoids criticism. It seems to me that these second order criticisms are cruicial.)

---

Explicator's note: This covers through page 3. While I still think the first paragraph is painful, the close reading is helping me get into Greenspan's style. Which is good, since there are some juicy bits to mull over. I'll be taking up the remaining pages in later posts.